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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
virtue of his having merely used the wrong word. Thus, the
court under 1041 would not gain the power of appointment of
one who was to take charge of the affairs of the estate.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The Louisiana Civil Code is clear to the point that assent
to a contract may be express or implied.' In the latter case
consent may be manifested either by actions or, in some cir-
cumstances, by silence or inaction. As an example the Code
provides that to receive goods from a merchant without any
express promise, and to use them, implies a contract to pay the
value. This basic principle was applied in Bascle v. Perez,2
where the defendant was held bound to pay the reasonable value
of services rendered for him by the plaintiff, the compensation
not having been fixed by the agreement. Relying on a series
of earlier cases, the court observed that this disposition of the
case was controlled by the moral maxim of the law that no
one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another. Actually,
when services are rendered and received with the expectation
of payment the recipient impliedly agrees to pay their reason-
able value. A judgment for such amount is therefore simply
an enforcement of the agreement and reliance on a theory of
unjust enrichment is unnecessary.
In Lafleur v. Brown3 the court held that an action for dam-
ages sustained in consequence of defendant's failure to deepen
a well and to install properly a pump therein was contractual.
It therefore overruled a plea of one-year prescription based on
the mistaken theory that the action was in tort. Although some
allegations of the petition gave color to the defendant's position,
the petition as a whole amply supported the contrary conclu-
sion.
The case of Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Saint Denis Se-
curities Co.4 that involved a claim for damages for breach of
a contract to sell real estate was lost by the plaintiff's failure
to show his acceptance of an offer made by the defendant.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Arts. 1811, 1816, 1817, 1818, LA. CIv CODD of 1870. But see Art. 1766,
LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
2. 224 La. 1014, 71 So.2d 551 (1954).
3. 223 La. 976, 67 So.2d 556 (1953).
4. 225 La. 51, 72 So.2d 257 (1954).
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The Code provides that consent, freely given, is a prerequi-
site to the validity of a contract.5 In consequence, an expression
of consent may be vitiated by violence and threats. Despite the
fact that the language of the Code is suggestive of inconsistency,6
the personal characteristics of the individual subjected to the
coercion should be considered. The proper inquiry should be
whether he (or she) consented freely and voluntarily, or did
not do so, not whether, under the circumstances, a person of
ordinary firmness would have been deprived of his free will.
This approach was properly applied in Ane v. Ane," where the
court overruled an exception of no cause of action levelled at
a petition charging coercion as a basis for annulling a com-
munity property settlement.
In another lack of consent case, error as to the principal
cause was found to have resulted from erroneous information
given by a real estate agent that the property he was under-
taking to sell was in a white neighborhood. The case was Car-
penter v. Skinner.8 In the case of Parham v. Ruiz,9 the evidence
was clearly insufficient to sustain a claimed misrepresentation
urged as a basis for annulling a sale of a hotel business.
In Knight v. Knight' the court found no merit in an attempt
to have a transfer of land set aside on the basis of insanity or
lesion beyond moiety. Another action of lesion failed in Dosher
v. Louisiana Church of God."
In Roux v. Stassi12 a contract for the sale of a house and
lot in a new subdivision was annulled at the instance of the
purchaser. The sale was conditioned on the latter's securing a
loan on the property. Because the default of the contractor re-
sulted in the filing of certain liens, the loan could not be secured.
The pourt refused to award the purchaser a return of double
the deposit as provided in the contract in the event of a failure
of performance by the vendor but did order the return of the
amount put up and the cost of expenditures made by the pur-
chaser on the property.
In a well-reasoned opinion in Huber v. Taussig8 the court
5. Art. 1819, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
6. Art. 1851, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
7. 225 La. 222, 72 So.2d 485 (1954).
8. 224 La. 848, 71 So.2d 133 (1954).
9. 225 La. 239, 72 So.2d 491 (1954).
10. 224 La. 483, 70 So.2d 97 (1953).
11. 225 La. 21, 71 So.2d 868 (1954).
12. 74 So.2d 161 (La. 1954).
13. 224 La. 453, 69 So.2d 919 (1953).
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found a valid exclusive purchase agreement by a lessee of prem-
ises used as a filling station and held that an option to termi-
nate the agreement did not give the lessee the privilege of act-
ing arbitrarily. It found, on the contrary, that there was an
implied obligation on his part to act in good faith and that the
question of compliance was to be determined objectively.
A considerable amount of jurisprudence has developed the
principle recognized in the Civil Code and Code of Practice
under which a third party for whom a benefit is stipulated in
a contract between others has an action to enforce it. A good
addition to this jurisprudence is found in First State Bank v.
Burton.14 Taking a very sound approach to the problem, the
court found sufficient manifestation of such an intention in the
language of an agreement concerning the drilling of an oil
well and in the manner in which it had been executed by the
parties. Prior cases have established, in harmony with the Code,
a liberal tradition with respect to the finding of consent by the
beneficiary. The instant case was properly consistent.
The court's opinion in During v. Thibodeaux5 constitutes
a new warning that contracts for the payment of money where
the value exceeds $500, when not reduced to writing, must be
proved by one credible witness and other corroborating circum-
stances. The plaintiff, a tile contractor, who had entered into
a verbal contract when no one but the other party was present,
failed to satisfy this requirement, as the court found. It was
also observed that in such cases the finding of the trial court
is entitled to great weight. The plaintiff in Toca v. Thompson
& Whitty, Inc.'6 also failed to prove his case.
In a carefully delineated opinion the court, in J. F. Auderer
Laboratories, Inc. v. Deas,17 recognized the right of a sub-lessee
to exercise, as assignee, an option to buy granted in a lease. It
also held that a suit for specific performance, which is a de-
mand that the contract be carried into effect, is itself a putting
in default. To be perhaps overly-technical, since a putting in
default is a prerequisite to a demand for damages, and the
suit was for specific performance, the stated proposition would
be significant only if damages for delay in performing after the
filing of the suit (i.e., after the putting in default) were being
claimed.
14. 225 La. 537, 73 So.2d 453 (1954).
15. 224 La. 814, 70 So.2d 882 (1954).
16. 224 La. 333, 69 So.2d 364 (1953).
17. 223 La. 923, 67 So.2d 179 (1953).
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The problem of the admissibility of parol evidence varying,
contradicting, or adding to a written contract holds peculiar
and baffling difficulties. In Rosenthal v. Gauthier,18 by admitting
parol evidence over the strenuous objection of defendant, the
trial court supplied a condition imposing a cost limitation on a
building to be designed by the plaintiff. In consequence, plain-
tiff's suit for his fee as an architect was rejected. The appellate
court affirmed. The decision was apparently grounded on the
proposition that since the contract with the architect did not
set forth the proposed structural cost, a resort to parol evidence
was necessary to dete'rmine whether such a limitation had been
imposed. This proposition, that seems to throw wide the door
to parol evidence of anything that might have been but was not
included in a written agreement, raises grave questions con-
cerning the meaning and effect of Article 2276 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. In the first place, it is not easy to understand why
the total failure to include a condition not necessarily a part
of the contract, should be deemed to create a hiatus. In the sec-
ond place, the evidence certainly went beyond anything con-
tained in the writing. True it is that it did not contradict the
writing, yet it did vary the latter in a critical way. An uncon-
ditional promise to pay became a promise to pay only if the
structure designed would meet a certain cost limitation. Article
2276 provides that parol evidence shall not be admitted "against
or beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have
been said before, or at the time of making them, or since." The
French tell us that the rule is based on the unreliability of verbal
testimony and on the proposition that since the parties have
declared their agreement in writing, the admission of parol
evidence would substitute another mode of proof for that which
the parties have adopted. 19 The rule applies, therefore, to parol
evidence, not collateral agreements in writing.20 The validity
of counter-letters directly contradictory of a writing is sufficient
proof of this.2 1 The present ruling invites the fabrication of tes-
timony to nullify a written obligation in violation of the theories
underlying the adoption of the article. It seems clear that the
evidence in question would not have been admitted in France.
And our article is almost a verbatim copy of Article 1341 of
18. 224 La. 341, 69 So.2d 367 (1953).
19. See Comment, Parol Evidence to Vary a RecitaZ of Consideration,
3 LOUISIANA LAW REvI:W 427 (1941), and authorities there cited.
20. Under the common law proof of oral collateral agreements, terms
or conditions Is permissible. See CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 582 et seq. (1951).
21. See Art. 2239, LA. Cirm CODE of 1870.
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the Code Napoleon. In any event, in view of the fact that
evidence imposing an unexpressed and oral condition on an
unconditional written promise works a serious change in the
character of the obligation assumed, peculiarly strong and con-
vincing testimony should be required. The fact that such a
condition is not stated in the writing should be accepted as
strong evidence that it was not made a part of the agreement. 22
Another case involving a problem of parol evidence was
Smith v. Bell.23 Here the court rejected an attempt to prove by
parol and through the provisions of an earlier written contract,
that the farm implements and equipment on certain farm lands
transferred by an authentic act of sale had been reserved by the
vendor. The proffered evidence was found to be inconsistent with
the act of sale inasmuch as, under the provisions of the Civil
Code, the sale of the land would include the implements of
husbandry thereon. Although the court recognized that extrin-
sic written evidence is admissible to prove a collateral agree-
ment going beyond a writing, it found this rule inapplicable
because the result of the application would have been to con-
tradict the act of sale. If, however, this test is sound, any
counter-letter contradicting a written act would be inadmissible.
But this is not the case. If the parties intend a later act to
supersede an earlier one, that intention should, of course, be
controlling; but, if a contrary intention appears, the later act
should not be deemed controlling merely because it is the later
or the more formal. This is what gives force and effect to a
counter-letter. The parties might well intend to segregate the
farm implements from the farm when a sale of the latter is
being made and if they make this meaning clear in writing the
supposed inconsistency between the act and the writing should
not be allowed to defeat their intention. Of course, under this
approach, the result arrived at in the instant case may have
been completely sound.
Forced heirs are expressly authorized by the Code 24 to use
parol evidence to prove the simulated contracts of those from
whom they inherit. Inadequacy of the price paid does not render
the transfer a simulation. In Succession of Nelson25 the court
22. See Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co., 125 Fed. 110 (3d Cir. 1903); Learned
v. Holbrook, 87 Ore. 576, 171 Pac. 222 (1918). But see Brandin Slate Co. v.
Fornea, 183 So. 572 (La. App. 1938).
23. 224 La. 1, 68 So.2d 737 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW Rsvisw 704 (1954).
24. Art. 2239, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
25. 224 La. 731, 70 So.2d 665 (1953).
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found that there was a real although inadequate price and re-
fused to set aside, as simulated, certain transfers by plaintiffs'
ancestors.
In Fuss v. Cordeleria de San Juan, S.A. 26 there was a re-
affirmation of the rule that a creditor who accepts a payment
tendered in full settlement of a disputed claim is estopped to
demand any additional amount.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
SALE
The sale is one of the particular contracts given special treat-
ment in the Civil Code. To it are applicable certain particular
rules that, as such, are not applicable to contracts generally.
Otherwise, the general rules of conventional obligations apply.
A demand for specific performance of a contract to sell real
estate was rejected in Guzzo v. Liggio.1 No time for performance
was fixed by the agreement, but since three and one-half years
had elapsed the court felt that the reasonable time within which
performance should have been rendered had expired. There was
some evidence of lack of a serious intent to contract for the
actual sale of the house but the question of the admissibility of
parol to show such intent was not discussed.
In Wainwright v. Lingle2 the court found that the plaintiff
who had paid for fifty shares of stock in a development com-
pany was entitled to the stock notwithstanding that two years
had elapsed since the contract was formed. The award of specific
performance was considered proper on the ground that by paying
for the stock the purchaser had acquired rights of ownership.
In Berniard v. Galiano3 the plaintiff, after successfully main-
taining a suit for specific performance of a contract to convey
certain improved real estate, was given judgment for the value
of the use and enjoyment of the property dating from the demand
for specific performance until the surrender of possession. Inter-
26. 224 La. 338, 69 So.2d 365 (1953).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 224 La. 313, 69 So.2d 357 (1953).
2. 224 La. 702, 70 So.2d 594 (1954).
B. 224 La. 1100, 71 So.2d 857 (1954) and 224 La. 1111, 71 So.2d 861 (1954).
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